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IN

The Supreme Court
OF THE

State of Utah
COMBINED METALS REDUCTION COMPANY, a corporation,
and
BUD T. STEVENSON AND JOHN
E. ALVER.SON, co-partners doing business under the firm name
and style of Stevenson & Alverson,

Case No. 6315

Plaintiffs,

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
GEO. A. CRIT·CHLOW,
J. A. TUCKER.
Amici Curiae.
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It is only after much hesitation that 've have ventured to submit this Brief as A1nici Curiae. Our hesitation has been chiefly due to the fact that the s21:1e
questions have been ably briefed and argued in cases
heretofore submitted and decided by yo1~r honorable
body.
In the case at bar, however, the decision of the Appeal Tribunal and of the Industrial Commission so flagrantly disregards the significance of the decision of this
Court in the case of Fuller Bru,sh Company v. Industrial
0 ommis.sion, decided July 12, 1940, and the construction of Section 19 (j) of the Unemployment CompE:·nsation La'v declared in that decision that ''{7e feel justified
in imposing upon the iCourt 's time to this extent. The
fact that counsel for the Commission strenuously contend in this case for a construction of the Act apparently
at variance with the opinion of the majority of this Court
in the Ftdler Brush case indicates an un,villingness upon
the part of the Com1nission to apply that construction
in its administration of the Act and a clesire to overrule
that decision.

QUESTIONS INVOLVED
While there seems to be no substantial disagreement as to any of the facts in this case, there does appear
to be some disagreement between the parties as to the
conclusion to be drawn from those proven. In this brief
we shall not be concerned with those conclusions. We
shall confine ourselves to the broad question :
Is the mining lease involved in this case a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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contract for serYices for 'Yages or a contract of
hire 'vithin the purview· of the Unemployment
Compensation ~\c.t ~
. A.nother 'Yay of stating this same proposition is:
Is the relationship established by the lease
the relation of etnployee and employer within the
conten1plation of the Act~
Subsidiary to these questions is that raised by the
appellant, namely:
If, by literal construction of the Unemployment Coinpensation Act, the relationship established by the lease falls within the Act, is such aresult within the constitutional powers of the Legislature~

Except where unavoidable in the discussion of the
above propositions, we shall refrain from consideration
of the actual op·era tions of the parties to the lease, believing that any departure by the parties from the activities expressly contemplated under the contract can
be material only for the purpose of determining whether
the written contract expresses the real agreement of the
parties or is merely a camouflage to conceal the true
relationship. In other words, in dealing with the case at
bar we shall assume that the lease is genuine and bona
fide and not a front to be used to circumvent the law or
for some other ulterior purpose. By making this exclusion vve do not '.vish to be understood as implying that
anything in the record suggests such a purpose. To the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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contrary, from reading the record we visualize operations perfectly consistent with the traditions of the mining development of the west; ownership of mineral
ground by the lessor, actual mining operations carried
on by the lessee, with no right of supervision or control
reserved to or exercised by the owner except such as are
necessary for the preservation of the property for future
development and to guarantee the payment of royalties
payable out of production-with work requirements to
assure some return to the owner if the ground actually
contains ores of commercial value.

ARGUMENT
Is the Lease Here Involved .a Contract for Services
For Wages or a Contract of Hire, Within the
Purview of the Unemployment Compensation
Act?
In sustaining the Departmental decision holding
that the lessees Stevenson & Alverson were employees of
the lessor, the Combined Metals Reduction Company, the
Appeal Tribunal made the following comment:
,,, The statutory definition of employment contained in the Utah Unemployment Compensation
Law * * * requires that we first determine whether
or not a service was performed for a wage or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express
or implied.''
He disp-osed of this requirement in the following language:
''In Paragraph one of the contract under consideration the Company obviously required a perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sonal service of the lessees. This paragraph reads
in part as follows : 'The lessee agrees * * * to
personally supervise the work and assist in the
performance thereof.' The remuneration of the
nature received by the lessees has been held by
our Supreme Court to constitute wages * * *. Our
proper conclusion therefore is to the effect that
the lessees did perform a service for a wage and
therefore the (a), (b) and (c) provisions of Section 19 (j) 5 will be applied to the relationship to
determine whether or not it was one which constituted 'employment' subject to the provisions
of the Utah Unemployment 'Compensation Law."
From this excerpt of the decision of the Appeal
Tribunal, which was affirmed by the Industrial Commission by its denying leave to appeal, it will be seen that
the Ap·peal Tribunal has made a ''pro forma'' ap.plication of the reasoning and rule of decision laid down by
~Ir. Justice Larson in the case of Fuller B·rush Company
v. Industrial Commission, 104 P. (2d) 201. Upon finding
that the contract required the personal attention and activity by one of the parties in doing the work from which
the lessees hoped to make some money and that it contemplated the receipt by the lessees of proceeds from
ores produced in consequence of these labors, which proceeds he called ''wages,'' he concluded that the activities
were services performed for wages and hence were covered by the Unemployment Compensation Act unless the
three conditions specified in sub-section 5 of Section 19
(j) concurred.
In arriving at this conclusion the Appeal Tribunal
fell into the same error which has lead to the conflict
of opinion reflected in the decisions of the various state
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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6
courts applying or construing similar or identical provisions of their respective state Unemployment Compensation Acts. This is the error in which this Court seems
to have fallen in its earlier decisions but which we had
thoughi to be rectified in the Fuller Brush case, supra.
We believe that this error is due to .a misconception
of the purposes and intent of the Unemployment Compensation Legislation, a misconception which is maintained and advocated by the administrative officials of
the Department of Unemployment Compensation and its
counsel, namely that because of the provisions of Section 19 (j) 5 the Unemployment Compensation Act must
be construed to include a field of relationships broader
in scope than the traditional common-law relationship
of master and servant and beyond the relationship of employer and employee as those words are commonly understood.
We expect to demonstrate in this brief that such extension of coverage was not contemplated by the Legislature by the adoption of the Act \vith definitions here
involved; and is not required by the language of that
Act. We also expect to show that the application of the
Act to relationships other than those falling \vithin the
general category of the traditional common-law relationship of employer-e·mployee would involve a construction
of the Act which would violate the Constitution of Utah
and the Federal Constitution.

The Results From the Construction Contended for by
The Commission.
Before discussing the meaning of the Act as disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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closed by the language used, the circumstances attending
its adoption and its antecedent history, let us first explore the inevitable consequences to which the adoption
of the reasoning employed by the Appeal Tribunal would
lead.
Because the performance of the lease called for personal activities on the part of the lessee which would
presumably be of some benefit to the lessor, the Ap·peal
Tribunal says that tl1is activity was a service within the
1neaning of the Act and since the lessee hoped, and no
doubt expected, reward in the shape of net proceeds from
ores to be discovered and extracted this reward was rernuneration for such service and therefore ''wages''
within the definition of the statute. Therefore, the services were "employment" and covered by the law unless
excluded by the concurrence of the three conditions specified under sub-section 5.
Let us apply the same reasoning to the following situations:
A lawyer renders personal services. He expects, and
frequently gets, remuneration from his client; therefore,
those services are personal services performed for wages
and unless the three conditions concur they must be covered by the law and the client must he considered an employer '.vi thin the Act and the lawyer his employee (assuming of course that the fee, "'vage'·', amounts to
$140.00 or more in any calendar quarter). We then examine Section 19 (j) 5 to see whether all of the conditions
for exemption from the Act concur and "\Ve find that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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la~er

is not entirely free from control or direction in the
performance of his services. He must be, and is, guided
to a certain extent in the performance of his services
by the wishes of his client. He is, of course, controlled
by the rules of practice and other statutory and nonstatutory provisions governing his conduct. His services
may be terminated at the will of the client. Therefore,
since the first condition of absolute freedom from control
or direction does not exist he is an employee, as are all
of his clerks and stenographers, and his client is liable
for contributions with respect to either the full fee
('·'wage") paid the attorney or the wages paid the attorney's employees, and perhaps both.

The doctor performs services for his patient for a
fee; therefore this contract is subject to the Act unless
the three conditions of sub-section 5 concur. But here,
too, in the performance of his services the doctor is to a
certain extent controlled by the wishes of his patient,
and in many cases by that of the patient's relatives. He
may advise an operation 'vhich the patient refuses to
undergo. He may wish and desire to keep the patient
in the hospital and the patient may refuse to stay. If
the treatment is given in the hospital the doctor must
conform to the regulations and rules of the hospital in
the performance of his services to the patient. His services, too, may be terminated· at the will of the patient.
Therefore the doctor is an employee of the patient, as are
also the doctor's assistants, nurses, etc., and the patient
is an employer, and if the doctor's charges should equal
or exceed $140.00 in any one calendar quarter the patient
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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would be liable for contributions under the Act.
The building contractor enters into a contract for the
construction of a building according to plans and specifications prepared by the owner or his agent, the architect, and subject to the supervision of the engineer and
inspector of the owner. The contract calls for remuneration for the work done in the form of a flat price.
The contract usually contemplates and sometimes requires the performance of personal services by the contractor or his superintendent which are for the ultimate
benefit of the owner. The contract price is in p·art remuneration for these services and is, therefore, to such
extent at least, "wages." Consequently the services contemplated by the contract are services performed for
wages or under a contract of hire and so are within the
coverage of the Act unles.s the three conditions of subsection 5 concur. But it appears that the contract itself
requires the work to be done according to specifications
prepared by the owner or his architect, a detailed and
specific control over the performance of his work; therefore, the contractor is an employee of the o-vvner, as are
also all of his sub-contractors, laborers, clerks and other
employees, and if the payments due to the contractor
under the contract amount to $140.00 or more in any one
calendar quarter the o'vner is liable for the payment of
contributions with respect to such payments under the
Unemployment ·Compensation Law.
Take the case of the ordinary oil and gas lease. The
lessee generally agrees to do certain development work
and to diligently operate completed wells. Following the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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argument of the Commission to its logical conclusion,
the lessee and his employees would become employees
of the landowner unless excepted by the three conditions
of sub-section ( 5). Nothing could be farther from the
purposes and principles of unemployment insurance.
Other illustrations as grotesque as those above can
easily be supplied. They all go to show that the construction of the Act used by the Appeal Tribunal and
supported by counsel in their brief in this case will necessarily result in absurdities and plunge the administration in to such difficulties as will endanger, if not destroy,
its value in the field which it \vas designed to cover.
The foregoing illustrations indicate the necessity
of first ascertaining what kind of service is intended by
the use of that word in Section 19 (j) 1, which reads:
'' 'Employment' subject to other provisions
of this sub-section means service * * * performed
for wages or under any contract of hire, written
or oral, express or implied.''

The Words 'Service Performed for Wages or Under
Any Contract of Hire" Necessarily Mean Service Performed by an Individual for Another in
the Relationship of Master and Servant.
In Fuller Brush Company v. Industrial Co1nmission,
supra, this court announced the construction of the Unemployment Compensation Act which we submit is the
only rule which can be applied without disregard of the
purp·oses and objects of the Act, the intention of the
Legislature in adopting it, the intention of the Social
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Security Board in recommending its adoption and that
of Congress in adopting the Social Security Act. It is
the only rule "\Yhich "\Yill give effect to all of the terms
of the Act and which will avoid the miring of the administration and industry in a morass of difficulties and
uncertainties. It will avoid the question of the validity
of the Act in certain constitutional aspects hereinafter
described.
In that case j[r. Justice Larson, after referring to
the definition of ''employment'' in Section 19 (j) 1,
''wages'' in Section 19 (p) and the three conditions specified in 19 (j) 5, said:
''But these three facts (referring to the three
conditions of sub-section 5) are not given for the
purpose of determining whether a certain labor
performed for service rendered comes within the
term employment as used in the Act nor for determining whether such labor or service is performed for wages as used in the Act. Sub-head 5
applies only to cases where it has been previously
determined, where the work or service comes
within the term of employment as defined in the
Act and that it "\Vas performed for 'wages or un
der a contract of hire.' Until it has been so determined sub-head 5 has no application. These conditions indicate a legislative intent to make an
exception, to eliminate from the operation of the
Act certain kinds of personal service in private
industry rendered for "\vages, but "\Vhich could not
well he defined by a single v1ord or class designation like those in sub-section 6. ''
After stating the facts of that case 1fr. Justice I_.jarson continues :
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Putting it briefly they (the Appeal Tribunal and Industrial Commission) found that
claimant performed personal service, that he received wages in the nature of commissions from
plaintiff and therefore such personal service must
have been rendered for plaintiff. That claimant
performed personal service is not in dispute, but
there is a dispute as to whether such services were
performed for plaintiff or for self and as to
whether he received wages therefor or profits on
sales. In other words was the relationship between plaintiff and clajmant that of employer and
employee or that of vendor and vendee~ The
finding being positive and definite that the claimant in the performance of personal service was
free from all direction and control from the plaintiff, both in fact and under his contract of hire,
it must follow of necessity that he did not perform
service for plaintiff under a contract of hire or
for wages and therefore the relationship was one
that never came within the scope of the Act because he was not in employment that would bring
him within the Act, to-wit: rendering personal
service for another under a contract of hire or for
wages. Since there \vas no obligation on plaintiff
to pay claimant any remuneration for service but
claimant must get his remuneration, if any, from
his ability to sell the brushes at an advanced price
over the cost to him and that he and not plaintiff
assumed the risk of profit or loss on the venture
or undertaking, it follo-ws claimant ''s services
were not rendered for wages or under a contract
of hire. The error came about through a misinterpretation of the law in holding that all personal
services were "'\vithin the Act 1mless excluded by
the provisions of Section 19 (j) 5,-whereas only
those personal services are within the Act which
are rendered for another for wages or under a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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contract of hire. As pointed out above, Section
19 (j) 5 is an exception provision, applying only
after it has been determined that personal services were rendered for another for wages or under a contract of hire. It excepts from this class
certain instances in which the three conditions of
that section are all present. ''
Thus in the case at bar involving the relationship of
lessor and lessee, as also in t4e case of every other form
of contractual relationship, it must first be determined
that a service is performed for wages or under a contract of hire, a question which cannot be decided by the
use of Section 19 (j) 5 for neither the word "service''
nor the phrase ''service performed for wages'' is there
defined. Resort must be had to extraneous sources to
ascertain the meaning of these words and phrase.
In the case at bar the remuneration expected by
Stevenson and Alvers-on and received by them after
months of unrewarded labor consisted of net returns
from ores extracted and sold during the later period
of their ·operations. The lessees operated at their own
expense and risk. The lessor never agreed to pay to
them any compensation or wage or remuneration whatsoever for their labors. To the contrary, the agreement
in this case for remuneration vvas upon the part of the
lessees who agreed to pay to the lessor remuneration or
rental for the use of the premises.
The case of the building contractors is a little closer.
In such case the remuneration is paid by the owner to
the contractor. It is not paid, however, exclusively for
the personal service of the contractor or for the perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sonal services of any individual. It includes the cost of
materials furnished in construction, the use of his equipment and the thousand of other items of expense which
enter into the performance of a building contract. While
the contract may call for rendition of services (i.e. labor)
which is calculated to be of ultimate benefit to the owner
for remuneration which, by the terms of the definition,
is arbitrarily called "wages," it is not a contract of hire
nor a contract for services for wages within the purview
of the Unemployment Compensation Law.
Other forms of contract creating the relationships
commonly known as that of principal and independent
contractor have been before the courts of other states
for decision as to liability for contributions under Unemployment Compensation Laws similar or substantially
identical with ·ours. In each of these cases it is held that
the relationship covered by the Act was that which is
commonly understood from the vvords ''employer,'' ''employee'' and ''employment.''
In Texas Comp·any v. Wheeless (Miss.), 187 So. 880,
the case involved the liability of an oil refining company
with respect to commissions paid . to a consignee of its
products. The contract under which the consignee operated provided that he was to defray all.of his expenses
of handling, delivering and selling, own and operate his
delivery equipment, etc., and account to the company
for the money collected by him from the sale .of the consigned products. The Mississippi Unemployment Compensation Law contained the same general definition of
"employment" which was covered by the Act as dor.s
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Utah's La,v. There, as in Utah, "employment"· was defined as
''Employment * * * means service performed
for wages or under any contract of hire, written
or oral, express or implied.''
(Compare with Section 19 (j) 1 of the Utah
Act.)
The ~Court said:
''To hold that every pers-on rendering personal service for a compensation of any kind (including commissions and bonuses) is an employee
of the person who received a benefit, directly or
indirectly, from the service would mean that every
automobile salesman to whom cars are shipped on
consignment for sale on commission, as well as
his helpers at the place of business at the sales
agency, all of whom gave their personal attention
to the sale and handling of the cars, would be
deemed employees of the factory corporation;
that every consignee of farm implements for sale
on commission, as a small merchant giving his
personal attention and services to the sales, would
be an employee of the wholesaler or manufacturer,
and that every attorney retained by several clients and who receives a volume of business sufficient to require the services of as many as eight
employees
* :r:· vvould be an employee of every
client, and likewise would his said employees, because of the fact that said retained attorney is
to give his personal services to the handling of
the business entrusted to hin1. We cannot attribute to the lavvmaking power such an unreasonable intention in saying that 'employment' means
'service performed for wages' (including commissions and bonuses) and that. ''vages means remun:;(<
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eration payable for personal services.' We must
inevitably look, therefore, to the meaning of 'under any contract of hire' .for a solution of the
question at issue. We do not think that 'contract
of hire' within the meaning of the act includes
such as the one here being construed, but that it
embraces and was intended to embrace only those
who are under the control and direction of the alleged employer in the performance of the details
of their work and in the use of the means employed."

Washington Recorder Publishing Contpany v. Ernst
(Wash.), 91 P. ( 2d) 718, 124 A. L. A. 667, involved a contract for the distribution of newspapers. The Washington Unemployment Compensation Law was identical with
ours. The term ''employment'' "\Vas defined generally in
the first sub-section of Section 19 (g), in the same language as the first sub-section 19 (j) of the Utah law.
There, too, the Washington Law contained the three conditions, the concurrence of which in any case of ''employment'' falling within the general all inclusive definition
of the term would exclude it from coverage. The Court
there held that the coverage intended was to he determined by the comrnon law tests of the employment relationship, and excluded fro1n coverage as an employee an
''independent contractor.''
1

The Unemployment Insurance Act of Nebraska contains a section substantially the same as sub-section (5)
of 19 (j) of the Utah Act.
In the very recent case of Ilill I-lotel Co1npany v.
J(inney, et al., 29'5 N. W. 397, the Supreme Court of NrSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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braska held that the Nebraska Act did not depart from
the common-law definition of independent contractor. w~
quote from the opinion :
'·'While there is a diversity of views among
the courts on this subject and the opinions are
not always unanimous, the weight of authority
is that legislatures in enacting unemployment
eompensation statutes did not intend to depart
from the common-law definition of 'independent
eon tractor.' That definition was adopted by the
legislature of this state in the enactment of the
Workmen's C-ompensation law and by the Nebraska supreme court in construing it.''

* * *
'''ln both the workmen's comp·ensation law
and the unemployment comp,ensation law the lawmakers legislated on labor problems and it should
not be held without sound reasons that they intended to vary tlie s.ta tus ·of independent contractors under the two intimately related statutes.''
In State ex rel Murphy Commissioner v. Welch &
Brown (Okla.), 103 P. (2d) 533, the Oklahoma statute
defining "employment" for purposes of Unemploymen1
Compensation coverage was as follows:
'' 'Employment' * * * means service * * *
performed for remuneration or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied.''
It was held that as the statute did not define ''con tract
for hire'' resort must be made to the ordinary meaning
of the words to determine their meaning in the context
of the Act.

Davies v. Mandelson Co. (N.H.), 11 Atl. (2d) 830.
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See also the following cases where the definitions of
"employment" were worded somewhat differently but
in each of which it was held that the coverage intended
for unemployment compensation was the usual and ordinary relationship of employer-employee.

Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Ramsay (Wis.), 290
N. vV. 199, was a case in which one of the points decided
was whether an ''independent contractor'' was an ''employee' and in ''employment'' under the Wisconsin Unemployment Compensation Luw, which defined those
terms substantially the same as does the Utah law. It
was held that the words ''employer,., and ''employee''
must be given their common-law meaning and the defining of the term ''employment'' as
"any service performed by an individual for
pay * * * under any contract of service for any
or contract of hire * * * and that each individual
thus engaged * * * to perform services for pay
shall he treated as in an 'employment' unless and
until the employer has satisfied the commission''
that (a) the individual is free from control, (b) that his
work was performed outside of the employer's places
of business and that he was customarily engaged in an
independently established business, etc., did not make an
independent contractor subject to the Act.

Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tone, (Conn.),
4 A tl. 640, 121 A. L. R. 993.
Barnes v. Indian Refinilng Co. (Ky.), 134 S. W.
(2d) 620.
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In the Matter of Fidel Association of New York (N.
Y.), 259 A. D. 486; 20 N.Y. Supp. 381.
Farnzers Mu.tual Fire Ins. Co. v California Employment Co,mJnission (Superior Ct, Sacramento Co., Calif.),
Commerce Clearing House Unemployment Compensation Service, Sec. 8291. Prentice Hall Unemployment
Insurance Service, Calif., Sec. 29, 623.

See also Corviello v. Industrial Commission (Ohio),
196 ~- E. 661, and lT' estern Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbu,ry
(Cal.), 159 Pac. 721, the last two cases relating to the
construction to be given the words "employer," "employee'' in Workmen's Compensation Acts.
The substance of each of these cases, in so far as
material here, is that the scope and intent of the Unemployment Compensation Law' is confined to the relationship of employer and employee as commonly and
usually understood, or of master and servant, and to
exclude from coverage the relationship of principal and
independent contractor.
The cases holding to the contrary are based upon
the misinterpretation of the purpose and effect of subsection 5, by giving to that sub-section the force of a definition of "employment" rather than a delimitation of
the application of the la-\v to cases of "services performed for wages or undPr a contract of hire." \Ve venture to say that had these courts had before then1 the
historical background of the development of unen1ployment insurance coupled 'vith the history of the enactment of the sections in ques6on, they 'vould have arrived
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at a different conclusion with respect to the proper construction of the statute. Furthermore, most of these
cases can be distinguished upon the ground that the facts
disclosed a real and actual relationship of employer and
employee contrary to the apparent relationship created
by the contract. In other words, the contract did not express the true agreement of the parties.

The Legislative History, Language and Plan of the
Statute Clearly Indicates Coverage Under the
Law Limited in Scope to the Traditional Common Law Relationship of Master and Servant.
In defendant's brief counsel concedes that under the
definition of employment which was contained in the
Unemployment Con1pensation Law of 1936, the law related to and covered the traditional common law master and servant relationship but they contend that the
amendment of 1937 (Chapter 43, Laws of Utah, 1937),
which added the sub-section 5 with its three conditions
so changed the definition as to make it immaterial whether or not the relationship bet\veen the individual and the
unit for vvhich the services were performed \vas that of
master and servant or principal and independent contractor. They contend in this case, as did the Appeal
Tribunal, that '·'all services performed for 'wages' shall
constitute employment unless the three conditions speeified in sub-section 5 concur'' and that this change of definition, including as it does (if \Ve accept the w·ord "'services'' in its comprehensive meaning and disregard the
person for whom the services are primarily performed)
a broadening of the scope of the Act, "ras deliberate and
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intentional.
A critical study of the history of the Social Security
Act in this country and of the Unemployment Compensation Law of this state will demonstrate that such extension of the scope of the la'v was not intended and that
the addition of sub-section 5 was intended merely to exclude certain types of services falling within the field
of master and servant vvhich were not susceptible of
general classification such as enumerated in sub-section 6.
Many books and articles were written on the subject of unemployment insurance in the years immediately
preceding the adoption of the F'ederal Social Security
Act and the Utah Unemployment Compensation Act. We
respectfully submit that a review of these publications
will demonstrate that neither the purpose nor the theory
of unemployment compensation contemplated the inclusion 'vithin the coverage of such acts independent contractors, lessees, etc., who work when and to the extent
they please and are dependent on self-effort for a living.
Furthermore, these publications will reveal that there
was no public or official advocacy that unemployment
compensation should be extended beyond the relationship
of employer and employee.
As an example of the contemporaneous thought,
we quote the follo,ving from page 26 of a book 'vritten
by Alvin H. Hansen, Professor of Economics, University of Minnesota; ~1errill G. Murray, Director of the
Minnesota State Employment Service; Russell A. Stev-
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enson, Dean of the School of Business Administration,
University of Minnesota, and Bryce M. Stewart, Director of Research, Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc.,
The University of Minnesota Press, 1934:
''In estimating the number of gainful workers who would be excluded from coverage by unemployment insurance, a count must exclude, of
course, the employer and entrepreneur classes,
such as farmers, manufacturers, contractors,
bankers, realtors, wholesalers, and merchants.
Nor would their managers and officials care to
be covered, since they are practically in the employer class (these should also he excluded by reason of their higher salaries, as will he brought
out later). In a category similar to that of employers are the self-employed, such as agents and
solicitors, professional P'eople, and self-employed
building and hand tradesmen.'' (Emphasis ours.)
The report filed by the President's C·ommittee onEconomic Security on January 15, 1935 (which is the basis
of the Federal Social Security Act), clearly recognizes
that unemployment insurance should only cover the employer-employee relationship. It recommends ''as essential the imposition of a uniforn~ pay1"oll tax against
which credits shall be allowed to industries in States that
shall have passed unemployment compensation laws."
As exemplifying the vie\v of this report, \Ve quote the
following short excerpt found at page 11:
"Even with compulsory coverage large
groups of workers cannot readily be brought nnder unemployment compensation; among them
employees in very small establishments, and of
course, all self-employed persons." (Emphasis
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ours.)
The local recorded history of the Unemployment
Compensation LR\Y commences in 1935 with the passage
of the Unemployment Reserve Act of 1935 (Laws of
1935, Chapter 38), "\vhich "\Vas entitled," An Act Establishing An Unemployment Reserve Fund And Creating An
Unemployment Reserve Fund Department Under The
Supervision of The Industrial Commission of Utah;
~laking ..._~n _i:\ppropriation Therefor; Providing Penalties For Violations Thereof; And F'or Other Purposes.''
In Section 2 of that Act the Legislature declared :

'' * * * that in its considered judgment the
public good and the well being of the wage earners of this state require the enactment of the
measure for the compulsory setting aside of financial reserves for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own."
Iz1 Section 3 of that Act "ernployment" is defined:

" 'Employment' except where the context
shows otherwise means any employment under
any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or
written, including all contracts entered into by
helpers and assistants of employees whether paid
by employer o1· employee if employed with the
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the employer.''

""\Vap;r,s" \Vere defined to include :

'' * * * the money received for services rendered such as bonus, and the reasonable value of
board, rent, housing, lodging or similar advantages received fron1 the employer.''
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By Section 24 of that Law the reserve fund was to be
created by contributions payable by each employer in
an amount equal to three percentum ''of the payroll of
the employees for whom he is liable to pay benefits under
this Act.''
After the passage of this Act Congress passed the
Social Security Act, approved August 14, 1935. This
Act was the outcome of the report of the Federal Coinmittee on Economic Security transmitted to the President on January 15, 1935, in which it was said at page 16:
''So long as there is danger that business in
some states will gain a competitive advantage
through failure of the state to enact an unemployment compensation law few such laws will
he enacted. This obstacle to said action can he
removed only through the imposition by the Federal Government of a uniform tax on all employers throughout the country so that no state
\viii have an unfair advantage."
The committee reports in the Senate and in the House
upon the Social Security Act contain sin1ilar statements.
The report of the Committee on Ways and Means in the
House of Representatives said:
"The failure of the states to enact unen~
ployment insurance la\vs is due largely to the fact
that to do so would handicap their industries in
competition with the industries of other states.

* * * A uniform nation-wide tax upon industry,
thus removing this principal obstacle in the 'vay
of unemployment insurance, is necessary before
the states can go ahead.''
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Accordingly, the Social Security Act of 1935, in so
far as it relates to unemployment compensation, imposed
a nation-vYide tax upon payrolls coupled with provision
for the allowance of credit against that tax for payments
made under state Unemployment Compensation Laws
vYith respect to the same payrolls. The plan is described
in Buckstaff Bath House So. v. McKinley, 84 L. Ed. 322,
as follo-,vs :
''The action was designed therefore to operate in a dual fashion-state laws were to be
integrated vvith the Federal Act; payments under state lavvs could be credited against liabilities
under the other. That it was designed so as to
bring the states in to the co-operative venture is
clear. The fact that it would operate though
the states did not come in does not alter the fact
that there were great practical inducements for
the states to become components of a unitary
plan for unemployment relief. It is this invitation by the Congress to the states which is of
importance to the issue in this case. For certainly,
under the co-ordinated scheme which the Act visualizes, vvhen Congress brought within its scope
various classes of employers it in practical effect
invited the states to tax the same classes. Hence,
if there were any doubt as to the jurisdiction of
the states to tax any of those classes it might
well be removed by that invitation, for in absence
of a declaration to the contrary, it would seem
to be a fair presumption that the purpose of Congress vYas to have the state la,,r as closely toterminous as possible vvith its ovvn. To the extent that it was not, the hopes for a co-ordinated
and integrated dual system would not materialize.''
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The credit against the nation-\vide tax on payrolls
imposed by Title IX of the Social Security Law is expressed in the following words:
''The taxpayer may credit against the tax imposed by Section 1101 of this chapter the amount
of contributions with respect to employment during the taxable year paid by him * * * into an unemployment fund under a state law* * *."
The tax imposed by Section 1101 is a percentage of
the total -vvages payable by an employer ''with respect to
employment.''
The identity of the words used in these t\vo sections
show that the credits to be allowed must be contributions
paid with respect to employment of the same character
as that with respect to which the n~tional tax was imposed. Contributions paid '''"ith respect to employment
not subject to the Federal tax are not eligible for credit
and consequently such employment if taxed under the
state law would be placed in a position of competitive disadvantage as against similar employnlent in states not
imposing such tax.
Section 1107 of the Social Security Act defines employment as follows:
''The term 'employment' means any service
of whatever nature performed within the United
States by an employee for his employer except

* * """ "
Article 205 of Regulations 90 relating to the excise tax
on employers under Title IX of the Social Security Act
(issued February 17, 1936), provides :
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''The "\vords employ, employer and employee
as used in this article are to be taken in their
ordinary meaning * * *.
''Individuals performing service as independent contractors are not employees.''
This definition or interpretation of the words ''employment,'' ''employer'' and ''employee'' has been sustained
by court decisions.
In Indian Refining Company v. D~allman, 31 Fed.
Supp. 455, the case involved a consignment contract substantially like that involved in the case of Texas ,Co. v.
Wheeless, supra, and it was held that the relationship so
created was not that of "employment" under the Social
Security Act so as to make the consignor liable to tax
with respect to the commissions paid to the consignee.
In Texas Co. v. Higgins, 32 F!ed. Supp. 428, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York rendered a similar decision upon substantially
identical state of facts.
As an aid to the states in becoming a "component
of a unitary plan for unemployment relief,'' the Social
Security Board sent to the state legislatures various
"draft bills'' for their guidance in enacting state laws
which 'vould meet the ''minimum standards * :K• required
under the Social Security Act.'' The first edition was
dated January, 1936, the second, September, 193'6, and
the last, January, 1937.
The Utah Unemployment Reserve L-aw of 1935 did
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not meet the standards set up in the Social Security Act
for participation in the Federal appropriations made for
the administration of state unemployment laws and consequently Governor Blood called an extraordinary session of the Legislature for the purpose of adopting a
law which would qualify.
In his proclamation calling this special session to
convene on August 24, 19'36, he described the purpose to
be to amend, "'Chapter 38, Laws of Utah, 1935, relating
to unemployment reserves so that said Chapter when
amended will conform to the provisions of Title III and
IX of the Social Security Act * * * relating to the said
subject.''
In his message to the Legislature he submitted to it
one of the early editions of the draft bills prepared by
representatives of the Social Security Board and recon1mended its passage. The Legislature adopted his recomn1endations and passed the 1936 Law in the form submitted without change in any substantial particular. Is
it conceivable that had Governor Blood any idea that the
Act which he recommended imposed a tax upon industrial, professional and other relationships not included
within the scope of the Federal La-'\v he would have failed
to mention it~ In fact it is inconceivable that had he
believed that it imposed such a tax, thus putting business
o_f the state under a tremendous competitive handicap
as against business in other states, he would have recommended it. It is likewise unbelievable that had the
Legislature so understood it would have adopted the
Act submitted. Utah's industry is under sufficient hanrlSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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icap as things are 'vithout the voluntary addition of a
2.7 percent tax on all profits and returns from individual
enterprise.
Apparently it is recognized that the 1936 statute was
never intended to have such a broad scope, as counsel
for the Industrial Commission and the State impliedly
concede that its scope was limited to the master and
servant relationship. However, after the distribution by
by the Social Security Board of its 1937 edition of a
suggested form of bill, which for the first time included
a sub-section identical with sub-section 19 (j) (5), the
Utah legislature amended the 1936 Act so as to include
the suggested sub-section. It is now contended that the
amendn1ent enlarged the scope of the coverage so as to
include persons other than those who were servants under common-law concepts, in spite of the fact that such
enlargement would so injure and perhaps destroy a large
portion of Utah's industry.
A comparison of the definition of "employment" as
originally enacted and as amended hy the 1937 Act (Laws
of 1937, Chapter 43) discloses no such purpose nor effect.
Under the 1936 Act (Section 19 (j)) ''employment'' was
defined as follows:
"Employment means service including service in inter-state commerce perf.ormed for wages
or under any contract of hire, written or oral,
express or implied * * *. ''
Under the 1937 Act (Section 19 (j) 1) "employment'' is
defined:
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''Employment subject to the other provisions
of this sub-section means service including service
in inter-state commerce performed for wages or
under any contract of hire, written or oral, ex..
press or implied * * *. ''
It will be noticed that the general definition of "employment'' given in the above quotations are identical
and the only change effected by the amendment was (1)
to add sub-paragraph 2 which refined the definition to
provide that it would include an individual's entire service whether performed wholly within or both within and
without the state under certain circumstances; (2) to add
sub-paragraph 3 which made it include services performed out of the state in the event the individual performing them is a resident and the commission approves
the consent of his employing unit that his services be
considered covered hy the Act; (3) to add sub-paragraph
4 which provides under what circumstances the services
would be considered localized within the state; and (4)
to add sub-paragraph 5 which excludes from coverage
under the law services vvhich, except for this provision,
would be included within the general definition, i. e.,
vvhen the individual performing the service has been and
v1ill be free from control and the service is outside the
usual course of business for \vhich it was performed,
etc., and the individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, etc.
It vvill thus he seen that the amendment did nothing
1nore than to clarify the law, retaining the general statement that the employment which \Vas covered \vas that of
service performed for wages or ~l!J~der a contract of hire
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except where the services were of the classes exempted
under sub-paragTaph 6 and also excepting those which
were performed under the conditions specified in subparagraph 5.
There being no definition of the word ''service'' or
of the words ''contract of hire'' we are compelled to resort elsewhere than in the law itself to ascertain the
meaning of the phrase '·'service performed for wages or
under any contract of hire.''

Legislative History of the Section 19 (j).
If by some twisting of language sub-paragraph ·5
can be interpreted to enlarge the meaning ·of ''services
for wages'' in sub-section 1 instead of to rem-ove from
the application of the Act services for wages rendered
under certain conditions, a study of the legislative history of the amendment itself will convince that neither
the Legislature nor the Social Security Board which
drafted the wording of the amendment had any idea or
intention of giving it such effect.
As stated above the amendment was in the identical
language and form of the 1937 edition of the draft of
state unemployment compensation laws prep-ared by the
Social Security Board for use by the states in enacting
a compensation law which would meet the "minimum
standards for state unemployment ,compensation laws
required under the Social Security Act.''
In the draft so prepared and submitted by the Social
Security Board appears a section which is identical in
language, punctuation and paragraphing with Section
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19 (j) as it "\vas enacted in the 1937 law. Appended to
this section in the draft submitted appears a footnote
reading as follows :

''The coverage of this entire paragraph is
designed to avoid the pToblem of conflicts between, or duplications of coverage, state laws
which is i1nportant both for purposes of contributions from employers and benefit payments to
eligible employees.''
It is significant that the comments and explanations
accompanying the draft omit any statement which would
indicate that the coverage of the state law if enacted
in the forin suggested 'vould extend beyond the field covered by the Federal law and cover business relationships
not subject to the Federal tax and would subject those
businesses and occupations to a local tax burden which
would place them in a position of competitive disadvantage vvith eompeting business in other states not subjected
to the same burden. There can have been no reason why
the Social Security Board vvould prepare and submit a
draft of bill containing a provision so oppressive to local
industry. It is unbelievable that the Legislature of Utah
intentionally would have adopted a law so discriminatory
and burdens-ome under the conditions prevailing in 1937
or at any other time before or since.
The use of the words ''minimum standards'' on the
cover containing the draft bills prepared by the Social
Security Board are likewise significant. The minimum
standards required by the Social Security Act itself
required only the enactment of a state Unemployment
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Compensation Law which covered the same field of employment as did the Federal Act. This, as has been
shown, is limited to the relationship of employment as
commonly understood by the use of the words "employ'·',
or ''employer'' and ''employee'' and does not include
service by individuals performing service as independent
contractors.
That the la'v which Utah adopted was intended to
meet this "minimum" and nothing more is clearly indicated in other ways than in the message of Governor
Blood.
Section 11 (h) of the 1936 Act requires the Industrial
commission to "cooperate to the fullest extent'' with the
Social Security Board, and to comply with the regulations prescribed by the Social Security Board governing
the expenditures of sums allotted to the state under
Title III of the Social Security Act for the purpose of
administration. This section vvas carried into the 1937
and 1939 amendments where it appears as Section 11 (k).
Section 11 (1) of the 1937 and 1939 Amendments authorizes the making of reciprocal agreements with other
states relating to recognition of benefit rights accumulated under laws of other states or under federal laws,
authority which it would be practical t·o exercise only in
case the various laws were part of a co-ordinated plan.
Section 24 of the Act, however, is most signficant.
This section provides :
"If the tax imposed by Title IX of the Federal Social Security Act or any amendments
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thereto or any other federal tax against which
contributions under this act may be credited shall,
for any cause become inoperative, with the result
that no portion of the contributions required wnder this Act may be credited against such federal
tax, then this Act by virtue of that fact, shall be
suspended until the legislature shall meet and
take action relative thereto. * * *
This section indicates, if it does not prove conclusively, that it was the purpose of the legislature to integrate
the Utah law with the federal plan, and that all contributions levied under the Utah law were to he eligible for
credits against the federal tax. If such eligibility is
removed by any cause, the operation of the Utah Act is
to be suspended, automatically, thus binding the federal
payroll tax to its Utah correlative and conversely the
Utah contribution to its federal correlative. This section
we submit clearly negatives any intent to levy a tax
which cannot be credited against a corresponding federal
tax. To paraphrase the words of Mr. Justice Douglas
in the Btftckstaff case, supra, ''it would seem to be a fair
presumption that the purpose of the Utah Legislattttre
was to have the state la"· as closely co-terminous as possible with the Social Securi,ty Act. To the extent that it
was not, the hopes for a co-ordinated and integrated dual
system would not materialize.',.
In briefs heretofore submitted to the Court in other
cases by counsel for the Industrial Commission it has
been argued that the attempt at the 1939 session of the
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Legislature to amend the Unemployment Compensation
La\v proved that the Legislature intended the coverage
of the law to be as extensive as that for which they
now contend.
During that session when a bill p-roposing amendments to the law was being considered in the Senate, an
amendment was moved which would have added phrases
to various definitions to specifically exclude from
covered employment service performed under such conditions as amount to a relationship of indep·endent
contractor. The motion was defeated, and this action, it
was urged, evidences the intention and desire upon the
part of the Legislature to have the existing law construed
as covering relationships falling within that description.
The arguments offered in support of and against
the motion to amend are not preserved and we are in
complete ignorance of the reasons for the defeat of the
motion other than are disclosed in the action itself.
vVe submit that the defeat of the motion is quite as consistent with the notion that the relationship created by
principal and indep·endent contractor was not covered by
the existing law and that consequently the amendments
proposed were unnecessary, as with any other theory.
So many reasons may motivate the votes of individuals
on a particular matter under consideration by a parliamentary body that it is impossible to attribute the action
to any one. The amendment may have been rejected because it was inartificially drawn. The Unemployment
Compensation Law is so complex that we can readily
appreciate the hesitancy of legislators not skilled in
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legislative lore to tamper with a bill dealing with a subject with which they are not familiar, sponsored by an
authority as impressive as the Social Security Board.

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
Construed as a Definition In and Of Itself, Section
19 (j) 5, Would Constitute an Unreasonable and
Arbitr.ary Classification Violating Due Process
and Equal Protection Under the Fourteenth
Amendment to t:b.e Federal Constitution and
Section 7 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the
State of Utah.
If Section 19 (j) 5 he construed as contended for
by the defendant in this action all persons who perform
services of any kind are included within the Act unless
the right to exclusion is shown by the concurring existence of each and all of the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of paragraph 19 (j) 5.
Only those services as to which all of these conditions
concur are exempted from the ·coverage of the Act and
therefore the question arises: Does the service so
exempted necessarily fall into a classification which is
not so arbitrary and unreasonable as to violate the requirements of due process~
The illustrations vvhich we have given above sufficiently indicate the arbitrary and unreasonable consequences of the application of the construction urged by
the defendant. For example, notwithstanding a contractor in the performance of a contract is absolutely free
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formance of his work, but by chance he is not customarily
engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business, he would be covered by the
Act according to the construction contended for by the
state. A contractor engaged in identical work under an
identical contract but who is customarily engaged in an
independently established business, etc. is not covered
by the Act. The question of whether or not a person is
customarily engaged in an independently established
business has no necessary connection with the matter
of employment for the purpose of coverage under the
law and a law which makes such an arbitrary condition
the distinguishing factor between the coverage and noncoverage violates the requirement of due process under
both the Federal and Utah constitutions.
What rational basis can there be for including within the definition of employment under an unemployment
insurance act the bona fide relationship of landlord and
tenant~
Why should one tenant who because of the
terms of his lease is required to perform certain work
upon the leased premises be included in the coverage
of the act and another tenant who perchance because
the rental is larger, does not have to perform such work,
be excluded~ What justification is there for classifying
a farm tenant as an employee because his lease requires
him personally to farm the land and plant such acreage
and crops as his landlord designates. Yet if the contention of the Commission is followed to its logical conclusion, this necessarily must result.
"If there is to be classification it, to be valid,
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must rest upon 'some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation, so that persons similarly circumstanced shall he treated alike' Royster Guano
Co v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 64 L .Ed. 939."

Utah Light and Traction Co. v. State Tax Commission, 92 Utah 404,68 P. (2d) 759.
The contention of the Commission implies a legislative purpose to extend the term ''employment'' to include landlords and tenants within the employer-employee relationship, and, follo,ving it to the logical conclusion, to extend that term to include client and lawyer,
patient and doctor, principal and independent contractor,
and other non-employment relationships vvithin that class.
Such classification by legislative fiat, we submit would
he unconstitutional. In the case of In re Chicago, R. I. &
Pre. Ry. Co., 90 Fed. (2d) 312, Judge Lindley, of the 7th
Circuit Court of Appeals, said:
'''Congress may not arbitrarily classify an
act as something, the attributes of which it does
not partake * * * but it may always designate an
act as coming within a certain category if in its
inherent nature it may reasonably be said to be
endowed with the qualities of such categ·ory."
The same limitation, of course, is applicable to the
Legislature. There is nothing in the hare relationship
of landlord and tenant which endows with qualities of
employment and the fiat of the legislature cannot change
that fact.
It 1:s, of course, unnecessary In this brief to cite
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authorities to support the conclusion that if the relationship covered by the Unemployment Compensation Act
is limited to that of master and servant, or employer and
employee, according to the common and well understood
meaning of those terms, the relationship created by the
leas·e involved in this case, "\Vhether it be that of landlord
and tenant or of principal and independent contractor,
is beyond the scope of the Act. The distinction between
such relationships has been often drawn in many cases
decided by this iCourt involving questions of workmen's
compensation coverage and tort liability.

CONCLUSION
In the foregoing we have had little to say about the
facts of this case. We have confined ourselves principally to the broad question of the limits of the coverage
of the Unemployment Compensation Law to be deduced
from the language used, the purposes for which it was
designed, and the confusion and uncertainties inevitably
the consequence of the construction contended for by
the State.
Applied to the facts of this case as we understand
them from the record, we submit that the relationship
between the lessor and lessees created hy the lease is
not the relationship which the Unemployment Compensation Law was designed and intended to cover, and that
the ''service'' of the lessees performed during and in
their operations under the lease was not "service performed for wages or under a contract of hire".
We also submit that those activities of the lessees
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cannot be .said to be ''service performed for wages''
unless the evidence would permit a finding that the lease
did not express the true contract of the parties but was
a subterfuge to conceal the real relationship. No such
finding was made by the Appeal Tribunal nor does counsel make any such contention. We readily concede that
in a proper case the Industrial Commission could look
behind the ''front'' to ascertain an actual relationship
other than that indicated by a contract.
Respectfully submitted,
GE'ORGE A. CRITCHLOW,

J. A. TUC'KER,
Amici Curiae.
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